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Abstract
Let L be some extension of classical propositional logic. The non-
iterated probabilistic logic over L is the logic PL that is defined by adding
non-nested probabilistic operators in the language of L. For example, in
PL we can express a statement like “the probability of truthfulness of A
is at least 0.3” where A is a formula of L. The iterated probabilistic logic
over L is the logic PPL, where the probabilistic operators may be iterated
(nested). For example, in PPL we can express a statement like “this coin
is counterfeit with probability 0.6”. In this paper we investigate the influ-
ence of probabilistic operators in the complexity of satisfiability in PL and
PPL. We obtain complexity bounds, for the aforementioned satisfiability
problem, which are parameterized in the complexity of satisfiability of
conjunctions of positive and negative formulas that have neither a proba-
bilistic nor a classical operator as a top-connective. As an application of
our results we obtain tight complexity bounds for the satisfiability prob-
lem in PL and PPL when L is classical propositional logic or justification
logic.
keywords: probabilistic logic, computational complexity, satisfiability, jus-
tification logic
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Related Work
Probabilistic logics (also known as probability logics) are logics that can be
used to model uncertain reasoning. Although the idea of probabilistic logic was
first proposed by Leibniz [24], the modern development of this topic started
only in the 1970s and 1980s in the papers of H. Jerome Keisler [15] and Nils
Nilsson [26]. Following Nilsson’s research, Fagin, Halpern and Meggido [10]
introduced a logic with arithmetical operations built into the syntax so that
Boolean combinations of linear inequalities of probabilities of formulas can be
expressed. Based on Nilsson’s research Ognjanović, Rašković and Marković [28]
defined the logic LPP2, which is a non-iterated probabilistic logic with classical
base. The language of LPP2 is defined by adding (non-nested) operators of the
form P≥s (where s is a rational number) to the language of classical proposi-
tional logic. In LPP2 we can have expressions of the form P≥sα, which read as
“the probability of truthfulness of classical propositional formula α is at least s”.
In addition to LPP2, the authors of [28] define the logic LPP1, which is a proba-
bilistic logic over classical propositional logic, that allows iterations (nesting) of
the probabilistic operators (P≥s). In LPP1 we can describe a situation like the
following: let c be a coin and let p be the event “c lands tails”. Assume that the
probability of c landing tails is at least 60% (because c is counterfeit). We can
express this fact in non-iterated probabilistic logics with the formula P≥0.6p.
Assume now that we are uncertain about the fact of c being counterfeit. In
order to express this statement we need nested applications of the probabilistic
operators. In LPP1 for example we can have a formula like P≥0.8P≥0.6p.
In addition to classical propositional logic, probabilistic logics have been de-
fined over several other logics (see the recent [29] for an overview). For example
in [18, 19] we defined two probabilistic logics over justification logic (probabilis-
tic justification logics for short). Justification logic [2] can be understood as
an explicit analogue of modal logic [5]. Whereas traditional modal logic uses
formulas of the form α to express that an agent believes α, the language of
justification logic ‘unfolds’ the -modality into a family of so-called justifica-
tion terms, which are used to represent evidence for the agent’s belief. Hence,
instead of α, justification logic includes formulas of the form t : α, where t is a
justification term. Formulas of the form t : α are called justification assertions
and read as
the agent believes α for reason t.
Justification terms can represent any kind of objects that we use as evidence:
for example proofs in Peano arithmetic or informal justifications (like everyday
observations, texts in newspapers, or someone’s words). Artemov developed
the first justification logic, the Logic of Proofs (usually abbreviated as LP), to
provide intuitionistic logic with a classical provability semantics [3, 4]. Except
from LP, several other justification logics have been introduced. The minimal
justification logic is called J [2]. By the famous realization theorem [4, 6] J
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corresponds to the minimal modal logic K. That is, we can translate any theorem
of J to a theorem of K by replacing any term with the  and also any theorem
of K to a theorem of J by replacing any occurrence of  with an appropriate
justification term.
The non-iterated probabilistic logic over J, the logic PJ, is defined in [18] and
the iterated probabilistic logic over J, the logic PPJ, is defined in [19]. In PJ we
can describe a situation like the following: assume that an agent reads in some
reliable newspaper that fact α holds and also that the agent hears that fact α
holds from some unreliable neighbour. Then, the agent has two justifications for
α: the text of the newspaper, represented by s, and the words of their neighbour,
represented by t. We can express the fact that the newspaper is a more reliable
source than the neighbour using the PJ-formulas P≥0.8(s : α) and P≥0.2(t : α).
So, we can use probabilistic justification logic to model the idea that
different kinds of evidence for α lead to different degrees of belief in α.
It is tempting to try to model the above idea using formulas of the form s →
P≥0.8α (which are not allowed in the syntax of PJ). However this approach
treats justifications as statements: in order for P≥0.8α to hold, s has to hold
too. In our approach this is not necessary. We believe that justifications do not
need to be true, simply because one might want to believe something for a false
reason. Also this approach places the uncertainty on top of formula α. The
approach of PJ places the uncertainty where it should be: on the the fact that
s justifies α.
The most interesting property of the logic PPJ is the fact that the language
of PPJ allows applying justification terms to probabilistic operators and vice
versa (as we will see later this is the property that makes finding complexity
bounds for the satisfiability problem in PPJ a challenging task). So, continuing
our example with the counterfeit coin, if p is the event “the coin lands tails”,
and t is some explicit reason to believe that, then in PPJ we could have the
formula P≥0.8(t : P≥0.3p), with a meaning like “I am uncertain for a particular
justification of this coin being counterfeit, e.g. because this coin looks similar
to a counterfeit coin I have seen some time ago”. As another application of
PPJ, in [19] we have shown that the lottery paradox [23] can be analysed in this
logic. The lottery paradox goes as follows: assume that we have 1, 000 tickets
in a lottery where every ticket has the same probability to win and there is
exactly one winning ticket. Now assume a proposition is believed if and only if
its degree of belief is greater than 0.99. In this setting it is rational to believe
that ticket 1 does not win, it is rational to believe that ticket 2 does not win,
and so on. However, this entails that it is rational to believe that no ticket
wins because rational belief is closed under conjunction. Hence, it is rational to
believe that no ticket wins and (of course) it is rational to believe that one ticket
wins, which is absurd. In [19] we have formalized the lottery paradox in PPJ
and we have also proposed a solution for avoiding the paradox via restricting
the axioms that are justified in PPJ.
A model for a non-iterated probabilistic logic is a probability space where
the events are models of the base logic. A model for an iterated probabilistic
3
logic is a probability space where the events contain models of the base logic
and other probability spaces, so that we can deal with iterated probabilities.
One can say that the models for iterated probabilistic logics look like Kripke
structures, where the accessibility relation is replaced by a probability measure.
The satisfiability problem for a probabilistic logic is to decide whether such
a model that satisfies a given formula exists. In the 1980s Georgakopoulos
et al. [12] studied a problem that is very similar to the satisfiability problem
in probabilistic logics. This problem is called PSAT and it is a probabilistic
version of the famous satisfiability problem in classical propositional logic (i.e.
the well known SAT-problem [31]). The problem PSAT can be formalized as
follows: assume that we are given a formula in conjunctive normal form and
a probability for each clause. Is there a probability distribution (over the set
of all possible truth assignments of the variables appearing in the clauses) that
satisfies all the clauses? Georgakopoulos et al. reduced PSAT to solving a
linear system, and proved that PSAT is NP-complete. Although the expressive
power of the formal systems of [10] and [28] is richer than the one of [12], the
authors of [10] and [28] were able to use arguments similar to those in [12] to
show that the satisfiability problem in their logics is also NP-complete. In [16]
we obtained tight bounds for the complexity of the satisfiability problem in
non-iterated probabilistic justification logic, using again some results from the
theory of linear programming. Fagin and Halpern [11] mention (without giving
a complete formal proof) that complexity bounds for the satisfiability problem
in a modal logic that allows nesting of the probabilistic operators (like in LPP1)
can be obtained by employing an algorithm based on a tableau construction as
in classical modal logic [13]. In [17] we used the idea of Fagin and Halpern in
order to obtain tight bounds for the complexity of satisfiability in PPJ.
1.2 Our Contribution
The goal of this paper is to summarize and generalize the results for the com-
plexity of the satisfiability problem in non-iterated and iterated probabilistic
logics. This paper is the extended journal version of [16] and [17] which were
presented at “Foundations of Information and Knowledge Systems" in 2016 and
the “11th Panhellenic Logic Symposium" in 2017 respectively. The results of
[16, 17] refer only to probabilistic justification logic, whereas in the present pa-
per we make clear that our results can be applied to an non-iterated and iterated
probabilistic logic over any extension of classical propositional logic. Whereas
the result of [16] is a straightforward adaptation of some arguments from [10],
the result of [17] is new and non-trivial. The fact that a tableaux method can
be used for obtaining complexity bounds for iterated probabilistic logics was
already observed in [11], but no formal proof was given. In the short conference
papers [19] and [17] we gave decidability and complexity proofs respectively
for iterated probabilistic justification logic. In the present paper we give the
complexity (and thus decidability proof) for PPJ in full detail using a tableaux
method. More precisely, we present upper and lower complexity bounds, for the
aforementioned satisfiability problem, which are parameterized on the complex-
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ity of satisfiability of conjunctions of positive and negative formulas that have
neither a probabilistic nor a classical operator as a top-connective. We also
show how our results can be applied to the special cases where the probabilistic
logics are defined over classical propositional logic or justification logic.
1.3 Outline of the Paper
In Section 2 we give some preliminary definitions and prove a lemma from the
theory of linear programming that is necessary for our analysis. In Sections 3
and 4 we obtain complexity bounds for the satisfiability problem in non-iterated
and iterated probabilistic logics over any extension of classical propositional
logic. In Section 5 we apply the results of Sections 3 and 4 to determine the
complexity of satisfiability in probabilistic logics over classical propositional logic
and over justification logic. In Section 6 we present our final remarks and present
some directions for further research.
2 Preliminaries
For the purposes of this paper a logic is a formal system, defined via a set of
axioms and inference rules, a notion of semantics (i.e. a formal definition of
the notion of model for the logic), together with a provability and satisfiability
relation over some formal language. In this paper we are interested in obtaining
complexity bounds for the following decision problem:
Definition 1 (Satisfiability Problem). Let L be a logic over some language L.
The satisfiability problem for L (denoted as LSAT) is the following problem:
given some α ∈ L, is there a model of L that satisfies α?
For a formula α in the language of some logic L, α is satisfiable means that
there is an L-model that satisfies α. If the satisfiability in L is defined in worlds of
the models, then α is satisfiable means that there is a model of L,M , and a world
w, such that α is satisfied in the world w of M . Since the satisfiability problem
depends only on semantical notions, we will present all the logics without the
corresponding axiomatization. The only exceptions are the basic justification
logic J and the iterated probabilistic logic over J, PPJ, where it is necessary to
know what the axioms of the logic are, for properly defining the models.
All the logics in this paper are extensions of classical propositional logic.
The following definition is very important for our analysis.
Definition 2 (Basic Formulas). Let L be a logic over language L. The basic
formulas of L (represented as B(L)) are the formulas of L that do not have ¬,
∧ or a probabilistic operator P≥s (the probabilistic operators will be formally
defined later) as their top-connectives. We assume that B(L) contains at least
Prop, which is a countable set of atomic propositions. We will refer to the
elements of B(L) as the basic formulas of language L or the basic formulas of
logic L.
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In the rest of the paper we fix a logic L over a language L. We assume that
L is an extension of classical propositional logic and that L is defined by the
following grammar:
α ::= b | ¬α | α ∧ α,
where b ∈ B(L). We assume that we are given a function v which assigns a
truth value (T for true and F for false) to elements of B(L). The extension of v
to the elements of L is the function v¯, which is defined classically. Sometimes,
we will abuse notation and use the symbol v in place of v¯. We will refer to v
(or its extension) as an evaluation. We use Greek lower-case letters like α, β,
γ, . . . for members of L. The symbol P stands for powerset. We also define the
following abbreviations in the standard way:
α ∨ β ≡ ¬(¬α ∧ ¬β) ;
α→ β ≡ ¬α ∨ β .
From the above discussion it is clear that in order to define the semantics
of L it suffices to determine which are the basic formulas and how the evalua-
tion behaves on them. For example, if we assume that the basic formulas are
atomic propositions (i.e. elements of Prop) and that the evaluation is a classical
truth assignment, then we have defined the language and semantics of classical
propositional logic.
In the next sections we define probabilistic logics over L. Models for these
logics are probability spaces where the events are models for L (and in the
iterated case contain other probability spaces too). In order to formally present
these models, we need the following definitions:
Definition 3 (σ-Algebra Over a Set). Let W be a non-empty set and let H be
a non-empty subset of P(W ). We call H a σ-algebra over W if the following
hold:
• W ∈ H ;
• U ∈ H =⇒W \ U ∈ H .
• For any countable collection of elements of H , U0, U1, . . ., it holds that:⋃
i∈N
Ui ∈ H .
Definition 4 (σ-Additive Measure). Let H be a σ-algebra overW and assume
that µ : H → [0, 1]. We call µ a σ-additive measure if the following hold:
(1) µ(W ) = 1.
(2) Let U0, U1, . . . be a countable collection of pairwise disjoint elements of H .
Then:
µ
(⋃
i∈N
Ui
)
=
∑
i∈N
µ(Ui).
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Definition 5 (Probability Space). A probability space is a structure 〈W,H, µ〉,
where:
• W is a non-empty set;
• H is a σ-algebra over W ;
• µ : H → [0, 1] is a σ-additive measure.
The members of H are called measurable sets.
A finitely additive measure can be defined by assuming a finite, instead
of a countable, union in the previous definitions. Semantics for probabilis-
tic logics over classical propositional logic has been given both for σ- and for
finitely additive measures [28]. Semantics for probabilistic logics over justifica-
tion logic [18, 19] has been given only for finitely additive measures. However,
after the small model theorems that we will prove, the probability spaces in the
models will be finite, so the results of this paper hold for the finitely additive
case too.
As we mentioned in the introduction, decidability and complexity results in
probabilistic logics heavily depend on results from the theory of linear program-
ming. In this paper we will use a theorem that provides bounds on the size of
a solution of a linear system using the sizes of the constants that appear in the
system. Before showing this result, we need to define the size for non-negative
integers and rational numbers and to present Theorem 7. We use bold font
for vectors. The superscript ∗ in a vector denotes that the vector represents a
solution of some linear system.
Definition 6 (Sizes). Let r be a non-negative integer. The size of r, represented
as |r|, is the number of bits needed for representing r in the binary system. If
r = s1
s2
is a rational number, where s1 and s2 are relatively prime non-negative
integers with s2 6= 0, then the size of r is |r| := |s1|+ |s2|.
Theorem 7 ([7, p. 145]). Let S be a system of r linear equalities. Assume that
the vector x∗ is a solution of S such that all of x∗’s entries are non-negative.
Then there is a vector y∗ such that
(1) y∗ is a solution of S;
(2) all the entries of y∗ are non-negative;
(3) at most r entries of y∗ are positive.
Theorem 8 provides the anounced bounds on the solution of a linear system.
A sketch of its proof was given in [10, Lemmata 2.5 and 2.7]. To make our
presentation complete, we provide a detailed proof here.
Theorem 8. Let S be a linear system of n variables and of r linear equalities
and/or inequalities with integer coefficients each of size at most l. Assume that
the vector x∗ = x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n is a solution of S such that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
x∗i ≥ 0. Then, there is a vector y
∗ = y∗1 , . . . , y
∗
n that satisfies the following
properties
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(1) y∗ is a solution of S;
(2) at most r entries of y∗ are positive;
(3) for all i, y∗i is a non-negative rational number with size bounded by
2 ·
(
r · l + r · log2(r) + 1
)
.
Proof. We make the following conventions:
• All vectors used in this proof have n entries. The entries of the vectors
are assumed to be in one to one correspondence with the variables that
appear in the original system S.
• Let y∗ be a solution of a linear system T . If y∗ has more entries than
the variables of T we imply that entries of y∗ that correspond to variables
appearing in T compose a solution of T .
• Assume that system T has less variables than system T ′. When we say
that any solution of T is a solution of T ′ we imply that the missing
variables are set to 0.
Assume that the original system S contains an inequality of the form:
b1 · x1 + . . .+ bn · xn ⊙ c , (1)
for ⊙ ∈ {<,≤,≥, >} where x1, . . . , xn are variables and b1, . . . , bn, c are con-
stants that appear in S. Vector x∗ is a solution of (1). We replace the inequality
(1) in S with the following equality:
b1 · x1 + . . .+ bn · xn = b1 · x
∗
1 + . . .+ bn · x
∗
n .
We repeat this procedure for every inequality of S. This way we obtain a system
of linear equalities which we call S0. It is easy to see that x∗ is a solution of S0
and that any solution of S0 is also a solution of S.
Now we will transform S0 to another linear system by applying the following
algorithm:
(i) Set i := 0, e0 := r, v0 := n, x
∗,0 := x∗. Go to step (ii).
(ii) If ei = vi then go to step (iii). Otherwise go to step (iv).
(iii) If the determinant of Si is non-zero then stop. Otherwise go to step (vi).
(iv) If ei < vi then go to step (v), else go to step (vi).
(v) We know that the vector x∗,i is a non-negative solution for the system Si.
From Theorem 7 we obtain a solution x∗,i+1 for the system Si which has
at most ei entries positive. In Si we replace the variables that correspond
to zero entries of the solution x∗,i+1 with zeros. We obtain a new system
which we call Si+1 with ei+1 = ei equalities and vi+1 = ei < vi variables.
Vector xi+1 is a solution of Si+1 and any solution of Si+1 is a solution of
Si. We set i := i+ 1 and we go to step (ii).
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(vi) We remove only one equation that can be written as a linear combination
of some others. We obtain a new system which we call Si+1 with ei+1 =
ei − 1 equalities and vi+1 = vi variables. We set i := i+ 1 and x∗,i+1 :=
x∗,i. We go to step (ii).
From steps (v) and (vi) it is clear that during the execution of the above algo-
rithm, the sum of the number of variables and equations decreases. Therefore,
the algorithm terminates.
Let I be the final value of i after the execution of the algorithm. Since the
only way for our algorithm to terminate is through step (iii) it holds that system
SI is an eI×eI system of linear equalities with non-zero determinant (for eI ≤ r).
System SI is obtained from system S0 by possibly replacing some variables that
correspond to zero entries of the solution with zeros and by possibly removing
some equalities (that have a linear dependence on others). So, any solution of
SI is also a solution of S0 and thus a solution of S. From the algorithm we have
that x∗,I is a solution of SI . Since SI has a non-zero determinant Cramer’s rule
can be applied. Hence, the vector x∗,I is the unique solution of system SI . Let
x∗,Ii be an entry of x
∗,I . Entry x∗,Ii is equal to the following rational number:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
a11 . . . a1eI
. . .
aeI 1 . . . aeIeI
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
b11 . . . b1eI
. . .
beI 1 . . . beIeI
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
,
where all the aij and bij are integers that appear in the original system S. By
properties of the determinant we know that the numerator and the denominator
of the above rational number will each be at most equal to r! · (2l − 1)r. So we
have that:
|x∗,Ii | ≤ 2 ·
(
log2(r! · (2
l − 1)r) + 1
)
=⇒
|x∗,Ii | ≤ 2 ·
(
log2(r
r · 2l·r) + 1
)
=⇒
|x∗,Ii | ≤ 2 ·
(
r · log2(r) + l · r + 1
)
.
As we already mentioned the final vector x∗,I is a solution of the original linear
system S. We also have that all the entries of x∗,I are non-negative, at most
r of its entries are positive and the size of each entry of x∗,I is bounded by
2 · (r · log2 r + r · l + 1). So, x
∗,I is the desired vector y∗. 
3 Non-Iterated Probabilistic Logics
In Subsection 3.1 we define the semantics for non-iterated probabilistic logics.
In Subsection 3.2 we prove a small model property and in Subsection 3.3 we
present a conditional complexity upper bound for these logics.
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3.1 Semantics
The non-iterated probabilistic logic over L is the logic PL. The language of
PL is defined by adding non-nested probabilistic operators to the language L.
Formally, LPL = L
′
PL ∪ L, where L
′
PL is described by the following grammar:
A ::= P≥sα | ¬A | A ∧A ,
where s ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] and α ∈ L. Recall that by definition, the basic formulas
of PL are the formulas of LPL that do not have ¬,∧ or a probabilistic operator
as a top connective. Hence we have that B(LPL) = B(L) ⊇ Prop, i.e. LPL has
the same basic formulas as L. The intended meaning of the formula P≥sα is
that “the probability of truthfulness for α is at least s”. For LPL, we assume
the same abbreviations as for L. The operator P≥s is assumed to have greater
precedence than all the connectives of L. We also define the following syntactical
abbreviations:
P<sα ≡ ¬P≥sα ;
P≤sα ≡ P≥1−s¬α ;
P>sα ≡ ¬P≤sα ;
P=sα ≡ P≥sα ∧ P≤sα .
We use capital Latin letters like A, B, C, . . . for members of L′PL possibly
primed or with subscripts.
Remark 9. In the literature non-iterated logics either contained [28] or did not
contain [18] the formulas of the base logic. In this paper we opted for the
first choice. This makes our approach more uniform since all of our logics are
extension of classical propositional logic. We have to point out that as far as
decidability and complexity is concerned, both approaches are practically the
same: if the language of the non-iterated probabilistic logic contains formulas
of the base logic, then we simply have to use the decidability algorithm for the
base logic too.
A model for PL is a probability space where the events (also called worlds)
are models for L. In order to determine the probability of truthfulness for an
L-formula α in such a probability space we have to find the measure of the set
containing all L-models that satisfy α. More formally, we have the following:
Definition 10 (PL-Model). Let M = 〈W,H, µ, v〉 where
• 〈W,H, µ〉 is a probability space ;
• v is a function that assigns an evaluation to every w in W . We write vw
instead of v(w).
M is a PL-model if [α]M ∈ H for every α ∈ L, where
[α]M = {w ∈W | vw(α) = T} .
We will drop the subscript M , i.e. we will simply write [α], if this causes no
confusion.
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Definition 11 (Truth in a PL-model). Let M = 〈W,H, µ, v〉 be a PL-model.
The truth of L′PL-formulas that have a probabilistic operator as their top-
connective is defined as follows (the formulas with top-connectives ¬ and ∧
are treated classically):
M |= P≥sα⇐⇒ µ([α]M ) ≥ s .
Also if α is an L-formula then
M |= α⇐⇒ [α]M =W .
We observe that in order to present the formal semantics of a non-iterated
probabilistic logic, we have to define the basic formulas and explain how the
evaluation behaves on them.
3.2 Small Model Property
In this subsection we show that if A ∈ L′PL is satisfiable then it is satisfiable in
a model that satisfies the following properties:
• the number of worlds and the probabilities assigned to them have size
polynomial in the size of A
• the evaluations assigned to every world depend only on the subformulas
of A.
After we have established this result, it is easy to obtain the upper complexity
bound for PL: we can simply guess the model in polynomial time and then,
with the help of some oracles, verify that it satisfies A.
First we need some definitions. The set of subformulas of some formula A,
represented as subf(A), is defined as usual. The size of A, represented as |A|,
is the number of symbols needed to write A. In order to compute |A|, the size
of every probabilistic operator counts as one. For example, |¬P≥ 1
5
p| = 3. For
A ∈ LPL we define
||A|| := max
{
|s|
∣∣ P≥sα ∈ subf(A)} .
Definition 12 (Conjunctions of Positive and Negative Basic Formulas). Let
A ∈ LPL. The set of conjunctions of positive and negative basic formulas of A
is the following set:
cpnb(A) =

a
∣∣∣∣∣ a is of the form
∧
B∈subf(A)∩B(L)
±B

 ,
where ±B denotes either B or ¬B. The acronym cpnb stands for conjunction of
positive and negative basic formulas. If a ∈ cpnb(A) for some A and there is no
danger of confusion we may say that a is cpnb-formula. We use the lower-case
Latin letter a for cpnb-formulas, possibly with subscripts.
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Let A be of the form
∧
iBi or of the form
∨
iBi. Then C ∈ A means that
for some i, Bi ≡ C.
Theorem 13 proves the announced small model property. It is an adaptation
of the small model Theorem 2.6 of [10]. In [16] the proof of the small property
unnecessarily depends on the completeness theorem for PJ. In Theorem 13 we
remedy this mistake.
Theorem 13 (Small Model Property for PL). Let A ∈ L′PL. If A is PL-
satisfiable then it is satisfiable in a PL-model M = 〈W,H, µ, v〉 such that
(1) |W | ≤ |A|;
(2) H = P(W );
(3) For every w ∈ W , µ({w}) is a non-negative rational number with size at
most
2 ·
(
|A| · ||A||+ |A| · log2(|A|) + 1
)
;
(4) For every a ∈ cpnb(A), there exists at most one w ∈W such that v¯w(a) =
T.
Proof. Let A be satisfiable in some PL-model. We divide the proof in two parts:
• we show that the satisfiability of A implies that a linear system S is
satisfiable;
• we use a solution of S to define the model M for A that satisfies the
properties (1)–(4).
Finding the Satisfiable Linear System. Let R be some PL-model. By
propositional reasoning we can show that
R |= A⇐⇒ R |=
K∨
i=1
li∧
j=1
P⊙ijsij
(
αij
)
. (2)
for some K and li’s, such that for each i and for each j, ⊙ij ∈ {≥, <} and αij is
a disjunction of elements of cpnb(A). Since A is satisfiable, Eq. (2) implies that
there exists a PL-model M ′ = 〈W ′, H ′, µ′, v′〉 and some 1 ≤ i ≤ K such that
M ′ |=
li∧
j=1
P⊙ijsij
(
αij
)
. (3)
Let cpnb(A) = {a1, . . . , an}. For every k ∈ {1, . . . , n} we define
x∗k = µ
′([ak]M ′) . (4)
In every world of M ′ some atom of A must hold. Thus, we have
µ′
(
n⋃
k=1
[ak]M ′
)
= 1 . (5)
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All the ak’s belong to cpnb(A), so for all k, k
′ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we have
k 6= k′ =⇒ [ak]M ′ ∩ [ak′ ]M ′ = ∅ . (6)
By Eqs. (4),(5),(6) and the additivity of µ′ we get
n∑
k=1
x∗k = 1 . (7)
Let j ∈ {1, . . . , li}. From Eq. (3) we get M ′ |= P⊙ijsij
(
αij
)
. This implies that
µ′([αij ]M ′) ⊙ij sij , i.e.
µ′



 ∨
ak∈αij
ak


M ′

 ⊙ij sij ,
from which we can show that
µ′
( ⋃
ak∈αij
[ak]M ′
)
⊙ij sij .
By Eq. (4), (6) and the additivity of µ′ we have that∑
ak∈αij
x∗k ⊙ij sij .
So we have that
for every j ∈ {1, . . . , li},
∑
ak∈αij
x∗k ⊙ij sij . (8)
By Eqs. (7) and (8) it is clear that the vector x∗ = x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n is a non-
negative solution of a linear system, call it S. By Theorem 8 we have that there
exists a vector y∗ = y∗1 , . . . , y
∗
n, with non-negative entries, that is a solution of
S and has at most N entries (strictly) positive, where 0 < N ≤ |A|. Without
loss of generality we assume that y∗1 , . . . , y
∗
N are the positive entries of y
∗. Since
every x∗k corresponds to a cpnb-formula of A we can associate every positive y
∗
k
with the satisfiable atom ak.
Defining the Model M for A. The quadruple M = 〈W,H, µ, v〉 is defined
as follows:
(a) W = {w1, . . . , wN}, for some w1, . . . , wN ;
(b) H = P(W );
(c) For all V ∈ H ,
µ(V ) =
∑
wk∈V
y∗k;
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(d) Let i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. vwi is an evaluation that satisfies ai.
By using the fact that each y∗ is a solution of S we can show that M is a
PL-model. We will now prove the following statement:
(∀1 ≤ k ≤ N)
[
wk ∈
[
αij
]
M
⇐⇒ ak ∈ α
ij
]
. (9)
Let k ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We prove the two directions of Eq. (9) separately.
(=⇒) Assume that wk ∈ [α
ij ]. This means that vwk(α
ij) = T. Assume that
ak /∈ αij . Then, since αij is a disjunction of some atoms of A, there must exist
some ak′ ∈ αij , with k 6= k′, such that vwk(ak′ ) = T. However, by definition
we have that vwk(ak) = T. But this is a contradiction, since ak and ak′ are
different atoms of the same formula, which means that they cannot be satisfied
in the same evaluation. Hence, ak ∈ αij .
(⇐=) Assume that ak ∈ αij . We know that vwk(ak) = T, which implies that
vwk(α
ij) = T, i.e. wk ∈
[
αij
]
M
.
Hence, Eq. (9) holds. Now, we will prove the following statement:(
∀1 ≤ j ≤ li
)[
M |= P⊙ijsijα
ij
]
. (10)
Let j ∈ {1, . . . , li}. It holds
M |= P⊙ijsij (α
ij) ⇐⇒
µ([αij ]M ) ⊙ij sij ⇐⇒∑
wk∈[αij ]M
y∗k ⊙ij sij
Eq. (9)
⇐⇒
∑
ak∈αij
y∗k ⊙ij sij .
The last statement holds because y∗ is a solution of S. Thus, Eq. (10) holds.
By Eq. (10) we have that M |=
∧li
j=1 P⊙ijsij (α
ij), which implies that
M |=
K∨
i=1
li∧
j=1
P⊙ijsij (α
ij),
which, by Eq. (2), implies that M |= A.
So, we have that each wi corresponds to one satisfiable ai and also that
µ({wi}) = y∗i . Since the number of positive y
∗
i ’s is at most |A| and the size of
every positive y∗i is at most 2 · (|A| · ||A|| + |A| log2(|A|) + 1), we have that M
is, indeed, the model in question. 
The small model property shows that the formula is satisfied in a structure
with small number of worlds, small probabilities assigned to each world and that
in every world of this structure a unique cpnb-formula holds. The following
Lemma shows these cpnb-formulas that hold in the worlds practically define
evaluations for the formula that is tested for satisfiability.
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Lemma 14. Let α ∈ L, let v1, v2 be two evaluations and assume that, for every
basic formula β that appears in α
v1(β) = v2(β) .
Then we have
v¯1(α) = v¯2(α) .
3.3 Complexity Bounds
In this subsection we obtain the conditional upper bound for PLSAT. The upper
bound follows from the fact that for a given PL-formula A, we can guess a small
model for it and then verify that this model indeed satisfies A.
As a first step we need the following Lemma which can be proved by an easy
induction on the complexity of the formula.
Lemma 15. Let α ∈ L and let a ∈ cpnb(α). Let v be an evaluation and assume
that v¯(a) = T. The decision problem
does v¯ satisfy α?
belongs to the complexity class P.
Now we are ready to prove the upper complexity bound for PLSAT.
Theorem 16. Assume that the satisfiability problem for cpnb-formulas in the
logic L belongs to the complexity class C. Then PLSAT ∈ NP
C.
Proof. Let A ∈ LPL and let A be the C-algorithm that can test cpnb-formulas
in L for satisfiability. If A ∈ L then A is a equivalent to a disjunction of cpnb-
formulas (i.e. A can be seen as a formula in disjunctive normal form). So, we
guess one of these formulas and using A verify that it is satisfiable in poly-
nomial time using Lemma 15. Of course this can be done in nondeterministic
polynomial time using a C-oracle.
For the rest of the proof we assume that A ∈ L′PL, i.e. that A contains prob-
abilistic operators. A non-deterministic algorithm that tests A for satisfiability
can simply guess a model for A that satisfies conditions (1)–(4) that appear in
the statement of Theorem 13. We present a non-deterministic algorithm that
performs this guess and we evaluate its complexity.
Algorithm. We guess n elements of cpnb(A), call them a1, . . . , an, and we
also choose n worlds, w1, . . . , wn, for n ≤ |A|. Using A we can verify that for
each i ∈ {1, . . . , n} there exists an evaluation v¯i such that v¯i(ai) = T. We
define W = {w1, . . . , wn} and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we set vwi = vi. Since we
are only interested in the satisfiability of basic formulas that appear in A, by
Lemma 14, the choice of the vwi is not important (as long as vwi satisfies ai).
We assign to every µ({wi}) a rational number with size at most
2 ·
(
|A| · ||A||+ |A| · log2(|A|) + 1
)
.
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We set H = P(W ) and for every V ∈ H we set
µ(V ) =
∑
wi∈V
µ({wi}) .
It is then straightforward to see that conditions (1)–(4) that appear in the
statement of Theorem 13 hold.
Now we have to verify that our guess is correct, i.e. that M |= A. Assume
that P≥sα appears in A. In order to see whether P≥sα holds we need to calculate
the measure of the set [α]M in the model M . The set [α]M will contain every
wi ∈W such that vwi(α) = T. Since vwi satisfies an atom of A it also satisfies an
atom of α. So, by Lemma 15, we can check whether ∗wi satisfies α in polynomial
time. If
∑
wi∈[α]M
µ({wi}) ≥ s then we replace P≥sα in A with the truth value
T, otherwise with the truth value F. We repeat the above procedure for every
formula of the form P≥sα that appears in A. At the end we have a formula that
is constructed only from the connectives ¬, ∧ and the truth constants T and F.
Obviously, we can verify in polynomial time that the formula is true. This, of
course, implies that M |= A.
Complexity Evaluation. All the objects that are guessed in our algorithm
have size that is polynomial in the size of A. Also the verification phase of our
algorithm can be made in polynomial time. Furthermore checking whether an
element of cpnb(α) is satisfiable is possible with a C-oracle. Thus, our PLSAT
belongs to the class NPC. 
4 Iterated Probabilistic Logics
4.1 Semantics
The iterated probabilistic logic over L is the logic PPL (the two P’s stand for the
iterations of the probability operator). The language of PPL, LPPL, is defined
by adding nested probabilistic operators to the language L. Formally, LPPL is
defined by the following grammar:
A ::= b | ¬A | A ∧A | P≥sA ,
where s ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1] and b ∈ B(LPPL) ⊇ B(L). We will use upper-case latin
letters like A,B,C, . . . for members of LPPL.
Models for PPL are probability spaces where the worlds contain evaluations
and probability spaces (so that we can deal with iterated probabilities). For-
mally, we have
Definition 17 (PPL-Model and Truth in a PPL-Model). Assume that M =
〈U,W,H, µ, v〉 where:
1. U is a non-empty set of objects called worlds;
2. for every w ∈ U ,
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〈Ww, Hw, µw〉 is a probability space with Ww ⊆ U and vw is an
evaluation.
Truth inM is defined as follows (the connectives ¬ and ∧ are treated classically):
M,w |= A ⇐⇒ vw(A) = T for A ∈ B(LPPL) ;
M,w |= P≥sA ⇐⇒ µw
(
[A]M,w
)
≥ s.
M is a PPL-model if for every A ∈ LPPL and every w ∈ U , [A]M,w ∈ Hw, where
[A]M,w = {u ∈Ww | M,u |= A}.
We observe that, as in the non-iterated case, in order to formally define the
semantics of an iterated probabilistic logic it suffices to define the basic formulas
of PPL and how the evaluation behaves on them.
4.2 Complexity Bounds
In this section we obtain complexity bounds for PPLSAT. The upper bound is
obtained via a tableaux procedure, which resembles the tableaux procedure for
modal logic [13]. The idea for obtaining this upper bound for a modal logic that
contains probabilistic operators similar to ours was sketched in [11, Theorem
4.5], but no complete formal proof was given there. The lower bound is obtained
by drawing a reduction from modal logic D [13].
4.2.1 The Upper Bound
As a first step we need the following definition:
Definition 18 (Conjunctions of Positive and Negative Formulas). For A1, . . . ,
An ∈ LPPL, we define the following set:
cpnf(A1, . . . , An) =
{
a
∣∣∣∣∣ a is of the form
n∧
i=1
±Ai
}
.
The acronym cpnf stands for conjunction of positive and negative formulas. As
for the cpnb-formulas we will use the possibly primed or subscripted lower-case
Latin letter a for cpnf-formulas. If a ∈ cpnf(A1, . . . , An) for some A1, . . . , An
and there is no danger of confusion, we may say that a is a cpnf-formula.
We now present the announced tableaux method. Our tableaux are trees
where the nodes are formulas prefixed with world and truth signs. So, the node
w T A (w F A) intuitively means that formula A is true (respectively false)
at world w of some model. The root of a tableau contains the formula that is
tested for satisfiability. The tableaux rules are presented in Table 1. The first
line consists of the propositional rules and the second line of the probabilistic
rule prob. A separator, i.e. the symbol “|”, in the result of the rule means that
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w T ¬AnotT
w F A
w F ¬AnotF
w T A
w T A ∧BandT
w T A
w T B
w F A ∧BandF
w F A | w F B
pwij
prob
w.1 T a1 | · · · | w.n T an
Table 1: The Tableaux Rules
the formulas in the conclusion belong to distinct branches. So, only the rules
prob and andF create new branches; the other rules simply add formulas to
the branch where the premise belongs.
Every propositional rule gives simpler conditions for satisfiability: if the
premise is satisfiable then at least one of the results has to be satisfiable too.
The function of rule prob is more complicated and requires some explanation.
Rule prob is the only rule that creates new worlds. So, formulas that belong
to a path between two applications of rule prob are marked with the same
world. Therefore, we can define the notion of a world path. A world path is a
shortest path in a tableau that starts either from the root or from a result of
an application of the rule prob and ends either in a leaf or at a premise of an
application of the rule prob. We assume that the root, each one of the leaves
and each application of rule prob are marked with unique natural numbers.
In the following we will refer to the numbers assigned to the root, the leaves,
or the applications of rule prob as points. Due to the fact that all nodes in a
world path are marked with the same world and lay between two points, we can
represent a world path as pwij where w is the world prefix of the formulas in
the world path and i, j are the points. If formula A appears in world path pwij
(prefixed either with T or with F) we write A ∈ pwij . Now, the function of rule
prob in Table 1 can be explained in full detail: it is applied in the world path
pwij and it creates several new branches. Each of these branches is marked with
a new world symbol w.k (1 ≤ k ≤ n). Assume that
{B1, . . . , Bm} =
{
B | P≥sB ∈ pwij
}
.
Then the formulas al appearing in the result of rule prob are defined as follows:
{a1, . . . , an} = cpnf(B1, . . . , Bm) .
It is not difficult to see that each Bk is equivalent to a disjunction of some
al’s. Hence the world path pwij imposes probabilistic conditions of the form
P≥s
∨
l al or P<s
∨
l al, which using the fact that the al’s cannot hold in the
same world, translate to a condition like “the sum of the measures of some
al’s is at least or less than s”. So, even if in every result of the rule prob a
different cpnf-formula has to hold, each of these formulas will be assigned a
(possibly) different probability (which could be 0) and these probabilities will
have to satisfy some linear conditions imposed by the formulas in pwij . Thus,
while in the propositional rules we have the property “if the premise holds,
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at least one of the results has to hold”, in rule prob we have “if the premise
holds (i.e. if the conjunction of all the formulas that appear in the world path
of the premise hold) then each one of the results have to hold with (possibly)
different probability and some sums of these probabilites have to satisfy some
linear conditions”.
A world path is called P -open if there is some P≥sB ∈ pwij . Otherwise it is
called P -closed. Let pwij be a P -open world path that ends in the application
of rule prob j. All the world paths that start from a result of j are called the
children of pwij . To make the presentation simpler we will use the nodes with
the subscription of points as expressions in the metalanguage. So, we simply
write “wij T A” instead of the phrase “the node w T A appears in the tableau in
the world path between the points i and j”. Observe that the simpler notation
w T A is ambiguous. The reason is that the application of rule andF creates
two branches, where the formulas are prefixed with the same world sign. This
means that the same formula may occur with the same world sign in different
places in the tableau tree. We also have to point out that the points are only
necessary for defining the worlds of the model that will be obtained from the
tableaux. Even if some points appear in the premise of rule prob, they play no
role for constructing the tableaux.
For every pwij we define the following PPL-formulas:
Fpwij =
∧
wij T C
C ∧
∧
wij F C
¬C ;
Bpwij =
∧
wij T C,C∈B(LPPL)
C ∧
∧
wij F C,C∈B(LPPL)
¬C .
The intuition behind these definitions is that Fpwij is a conjunction of all the
positive and negative formulas (hence the letter F ) that apppear in a world path,
whereas Bpwij is a conjunction of all the positive and negative basic formulas
(hence the letter B) that appear in a world path. Observe that Bpwij is always
a cpnb-formula. Also if Fpwij is PPL-satisfiable this implies that there is an
evaluation that satisfies Bpwij . Let pwij be a premise of an application of rule
prob. When the conjunction of formulas in pwij hold (i.e. when formula Fpwij
holds) some probabilistic conditions are imposed (which are translated to linear
conditions in the probabilities assigned to the children of pwij ) and also some
non-probabilistic conditions have to hold (which are translated to satisfiability
conditions imposed to basic formulas appearing in pwij , i.e. to the formula
Bpwij ).
The tableau for some A ∈ LPPL is a tree that is created as follows:
1. Create the node w T A (this is the root of the tableau). Go to step 2.
2. Assign to the root, each one of the leaves and every application of the rule
prob a unique natural number. Go to step 3.
3. Apply the propositional rules for as long as possible. If there exists a
P -open world path, go to step 4. Otherwise stop.
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4. Apply the rule prob to every P -open world path. Go to step 3.
Every time a tableaux rule is applied, at least one operator (¬, ∧ or P≥s) is
eliminated. This implies that the tableau for A is a finite tree.
The goal of the tableaux procedure is to create a model for some formula,
if such a model exists. It is important for the reader to keep in mind that the
worlds of this model will not be the worlds assigned to each node, i.e. the w’s.
The actual worlds of the model will be the w’s, subscripted with points, i.e. the
wij ’s. So, it might help the reader to think of the w’s as pre-wordls, which can
be instantiated to several actual worlds, i.e. wij ’s.
Now we are ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 19. Assume that the satisfiability problem for cpnb-formulas in the
logic PPL belongs to the complexity class C. Then PPLSAT ∈ PSPACE
C.
Proof. Let A be the LPPL-formula that we want to test for satisfiability. Let
A be the C-algorithm that decides the satisfiability problem for cpnb-formulas
in logic PPL. We present an algorithm that decides whether A is satisfiable
by traversing the tableau for A in a depth first fashion. Then, we prove the
correctness of the algorithm and analyse its complexity.
Algorithm. The goal of the algorithm is to traverse the tableau for A and
decide which world paths should be marked realizable. A realizable world path
pwij contains all the formulas that are satisfied in world wij of the model for A
(if our algorithm decides that such a model exists). On the other hand, a world
path that is not marked realizable implies that the formulas in this path cannot
be satisfied in a PPL-model. We execute the following steps:
1. If all the world paths have been examined then stop. Otherwise, let pwij
be the next (in depth first fashion) world path. Go to step 2.
2. Mark pwij examined. If A fails in Bpwij , do not mark it realizable and go
to step 1, else if pwij is P -closed, mark pwij realizable and go to step 1,
else go to step 3.
3. Recall that by entering this step, we have selected an open world path
pwij , such that A succeeds in Bpwij . Now we proceed as follows: elect at
most |A| rational numbers (not necessarily different from each other) of
size at most 2 ·
(
|A| · ||A||+ |A| · log2(|A|) + 1
)
from the interval (0, 1] and
assign each one of them to a child of pwij . Assign the number 0 to the rest
of pwij ’s children. Now for each w T P≥sB that appears in pwij we run
the procedure prob_test_pos(P≥sB, pwij ). And for each w F P≥sB that
appears in pwij we run the procedure prob_test_neg(P≥sB, pwij ). These
procedures are defined as follows:
prob_test_pos(P≥sB, pwij )
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find all the children of pwij that contain B prefixed with T and add the
rational numbers assigned to them. If the sum is less than s return
failure. Otherwise return success.
prob_test_neg(P≥sB, pwij )
find all the children of pwij that contain B prefixed with T and add the
rational numbers assigned to them. If the sum is greater or equal to s
return failure. Otherwise return success.
If at least one of the above executions of the two procedures returns failure,
then mark pwij as not realizable and move to to step 1.
Let X be the set of all children of pwij to which a positive rational number
is assigned. Run step 2 of the algorithm to every member of X . If there
exists one member of X where step 2 of the algorithm fails then mark pwij
unrealizable. Otherwise mark pwij realizable. Go to step 1.
If, at the end of the algorithm there exists a world path starting from the
root, that is marked realizable, return “satisfiable”. Otherwise, return “not
satisfiable”.
Correctness. In order to prove our algorithm correct it suffices to show that
for every world path pwij :
pwij is marked realizable⇐⇒ Fpwij is PPL-satisfiable. (11)
Let pwij be a world path. We prove the two directions of (11) separately:
(=⇒) We define the structure M = 〈U,W,H, µ, v〉 as follows:
U = {ukl | pukl is marked realizable in the subtree
of the tableau that has the first node of pwij as a root} .
And for every ukl ∈ U , we have:
• Wukl = U and Hukl = P(Wukl).
• For every vmn, such that pvmn is a child of pukl we define µukl({vmn})
to be the rational number assigned to pvmn (which can be 0). For every
vmn ∈ U such that vmn is not a child of pukl , we set µukl({vmn}) = 0.
• for every V ∈ Hu: µukl(V ) =
∑
vmn∈V
µukl({vmn}).
• vukl is the evaluation that satisfies Bpukl . We know that such an evaluation
exists since pukl can be marked satisfiable only if A succeeds in Bpukl .
Since for every ukl ∈ U the rational numbers assigned to pukl ’s children were
selected in a way such that their sum equals 1, it is straightforward to show
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that M is a PPL-model. We will now show that for every B ∈ subf(A) and for
every ukl ∈ U :
(ukl T B =⇒M,ukl |= B) and (ukl F B =⇒M,ukl 6|= B). (12)
We proceed by induction on B. The only interesting case is when B ≡ P≥sC.
Assume that ukl T P≥sC. Then we have∑
{pvmn | pvmn is a child of pukl and vmn T C}
rvmn ≥ s ,
where rvmn is the rational number that is assigned to pvmn . By i.h. and by the
definition of M we have ∑
{vmn | vmn∈Wukl and M,vmn|=C}
µukl({vmn}) ≥ s,
which by the additivity of µukl gives us
µukl([C]M,ukl) ≥ s,
i.e.
M,ukl |= P≥sC .
Exactly the same arguments prove the right conjunct of (12) and this concludes
the proof of the if direction of (11).
(⇐=) We prove the claim by induction on the depth of pwij in the tableau for
A.
If pwij ends in a leaf, then pwij is a P -closed world path, which implies that
Fpwij ≡ Bpwij . The fact that Fpwij is PPL-satisfiable implies that there is an
evaluation that satisfies Bpwij . This implies that A is successful on Bpwij , so
pwij is marked realizable.
Assume that pwij has children. Assume that Fpwij is satisfiable in world wij
of the PPL-model M . Since pwij is P -open there is a K and some Cr’s and sr’s
such that M,w |=
∧K
r=1 P⊙rsrCi for ⊙r ∈ {≥, <}. Let
cpnf(C1, . . . , CK) = {a1, . . . , am} .
By propositional reasoning we can show thatM,w |=
∧K
r=1 P⊙rsrDr where every
Dr is equivalent to a disjunction of some ak’s. Now we proceed as in the proof
of Theorem 13. We show that the fact that the P⊙rsrDr’s are satisfied in wij
implies that there is a linear system S which has as a solution a vector, every
entry of which corresponds to the measure of some ak. By Theorem 8 we can
show that at most |A| entries of a solution for S have to be positive. And each
of these entries has size at most 2 ·
(
|A| · ||A||+ |A| · log2(|A|) + 1
)
. Recall that
each ak is assigned to a child of pwij . So, there are at most |A| positive rational
numbers that are assigned to children of pwij . The algorithm that traverses the
tableau for A should be able to find them. Then the algorithm should be able to
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verify that these rational numbers sum to 1 and satisfy the nodes that contain
P⊙rCr in pwij . Also the fact that Fpwij is satisfiable implies that A succeeds in
Bpwij . Furthermore the aj ’s that correspond to positive measures are satisfiable
in M . This implies that for every pujk , such that pujk is a child of pwij and
a positive rational number is assigned to pujk , then Fpujk is satisfied in M .
By the induction hypothesis we have that the children of pwij that correspond
to positive measures are marked realizable. We conclude that pwij is marked
realizable.
This concludes the proof of (11).
Complexity Analysis. We will show that our algorithm can decide whether
there exists a world path starting from A that should be marked realizable by
using only a polynomial number of bits and a C-oracle. We observe that whether
pwij should be marked realizable only depends on pwij and the subtree below it.
So, we can traverse the tableau tree in depth first fashion, reusing space. For
every pwij we need a polynomial number of bits to store pwij itself, the positive
rational numbers assigned to some of its children and the cpnf-formulas that
are assigned to these children. We can verify (using the C-oracle) that Bpwij is
satisfiable and that the probabilistic constraints in pwij are satisfied. Then we
can move to the first child of pwij (among those of which a positive probability
is assigned) and repeat the same procedure. Clearly, once we have that the first
child of pwij is marked realizable we do not need the space used for this child
any more. So, this space can be used for the next child. We conclude that the
maximum number of information that we have to store each time is at most
equal to the depth of the tree (which is polynomial on |A|) times the number of
bits needed to process a single world path (which as we observed is polynomial
on |A| again). We conclude that our algorithm runs in polynomial space using
a C-oracle. 
4.2.2 The Lower Bound
Before showing the reduction from modal logic D we observe that the tableau
decision procedure implies a small model property for PPL.
Corollary 20. (Small Model Property for PPL) Let A ∈ LPPL be satisfiable.
Then A is satisfiable in a PPL-model M = 〈U,W,H, µ, v〉, where
1. U ≤ 2|A|;
2. for each w ∈ U ,
(a) Ww = U and Hw = P(Uw);
(b) for every V ∈ Hw : µw(V ) =
∑
v∈V µ({v}).
Proof. The fact that A is satisfiable implies that the tableau procedure for A
succeeds. So, if we start a tableau procedure with w T A in the root we should
find a realizable world path that starts from w T A. Then as in the proof of
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the proof of the "if" direction of (11) we can construct a PPL-model for A that
satisfies the properties in the statement of this corollary. Since the tableau for
A is finite, the size of the model satisfying A is finite. 
Now we proceed with some standard definitions from modal logic. The
language of modal logic, L, is described by the following grammar:
A ::= p | ¬A | A ∧A | A ,
where p ∈ Prop. A Kripke model is structure M = 〈W,R, v〉 where W is a
non-empty set of worlds, R ⊆ W ×W and v is a function that assigns a truth
assignment (for classical propositional logic) to every world in W . For each
w ∈ W we define the following set:
R[w] = {u | (w, u) ∈ R} .
The semantics of L-formulas is given by the following definition:
Definition 21 (Truth in a Kripke model). Let M = 〈W,H, v〉 be a Kripke
model and let A ∈ L. We define what it means for A to hold in the world w
of M (written as M,w |= A) by distinguishing the following cases:
A ≡ B:
M,w |= B ⇐⇒ (∀u ∈ R[w])[M,u |= B]
A ≡ p ∈ Prop:
M,w |= p⇐⇒ vw(p) = T .
The propositional connectives are treated classicaly.
A Kripke model M = 〈W,R, v〉 is serial if for every w ∈ W , R[w] 6= ∅.
D is the modal logic that is sound and complete with respect to serial Kripke
models [13].
Now we can show the lower bound.
Theorem 22. PPLSAT is PSPACE-hard.
Proof. We will reduce DSAT to PPLSAT. Since DSAT is PSPACE-complete [13]
our theorem follows. Let A ∈ L and let f(A) be the PPL-formula obtained
from A by replacing every occurrence of  by P≥1. We will show the following
equivalence:
A is D-satisfiable if and only if f(A) is PPL-satisfiable . (13)
(=⇒) Assume that A is satisfiable. By the small model theorem for modal logic
D [13] it is satisfiable in a serial Kripke modelMD = 〈U,R, v〉, where U is finite.
We define MPPL = 〈U,W,H, µ, v
′〉 where for every w ∈ U ,
Ww = R[w],
Hw = P(Ww),
v′w is an extension of vw to B(LPPL)-formulas,
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and for every V ∈ Hw,
µw(V ) =
|V |
|R[w]|
.
It is easy to show that MPPL is a PPL-model. We will now show that
(∀w ∈ U)(∀B ∈ subf(A))
[
MD, w |= B ⇐⇒MPPL, w |= f(B)
]
by induction on the complexity of B. The only interesting case is when B is of
the form C. Then we have
MD, w |= C ⇐⇒
(∀u ∈ R[w])
[
MD, u |= C
] i.h.
⇐⇒
(∀u ∈Ww)
[
MPPL, u |= f(C)
]
. (14)
Now we have that Ww = [f(C)]MPPL ,w which immediately implies that
µw([f(C)]MPPL ,w) = 1 .
On the other hand assume that µw([f(C)]MPPL ,w) = 1. Then if [f(C)]MPPL ,w (
Ww then, by the definition of µw we get that µw(Ww \ [f(C)]MPPL,w) > 0, which,
by the additivity of µw contradicts the fact that µw([f(C)]MPPL ,w) = 1. We
conclude that (14) is equivalent to the following:
µw([f(C)]MPPL ,w) = 1 ⇐⇒
MPPL, w |=P≥1f(C) ⇐⇒
MPPL, w |=f(B).
(⇐=) Assume that f(A) is satisfiable. Then f(A) is satisfiable in a model
MPPL = 〈U,W,H, µ, v〉 that satisfies the properties of Corollary 20. Let MD =
〈U,R, v′〉, where, for every w ∈W ,
R[w] = {u ∈ Ww | µw({u}) > 0}
and v′w is the restriction of vw to Prop. It is straightforward to show that MD
is a serial Kripke structure. We will now show that
(∀w ∈ W )(∀B ∈ subf(A))
[
MPPL, w |= f(B)⇐⇒MD, w |= B
]
by induction on the complexity of B. The only interesting case is when B ≡ C.
We have that
MD, w |= C ⇐⇒
(∀u ∈ R[w])
[
MD, u |= C
] i.h.
⇐⇒
(∀u ∈ Ww)
[
µw({u}) > 0 =⇒MPPL, u |= f(C)
]
. (15)
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So [f(C)]MPPL ,w ⊇ {u ∈Ww | µw({u} > 0)}. Hence
µw([f(C)]MPPL ,w) =
∑
u∈[f(C)]MPPL,w
µ({u})
=
∑
u∈Ww | µw({u})>0
µ({u}) =
∑
u∈Ww
µ({u}) = 1 .
On the other hand assume that µw([f(C)]MPPL ,w) = 1. Let u ∈ Ww such that
µw({u}) > 0. Assume that MPPL, u 6|= f(C). Then u ∈ Ww \ [f(C)]MPPL ,w. So
µw(Ww \ [f(C)]MPPL ,w) > 0, which contradicts the fact that µw([f(C)]MPPL ,w) =
1. So for all u ∈ Ww , µw({u}) > 0 implies that MPPL, u |= f(C). We conclude
that (15) is equivalent to
µw([f(C)]MPPL ,w) = 1 ⇐⇒
MPPL, w |=P≥1f(C) ⇐⇒
MPPL, w |=f(B).
We conclude that (13) holds, which proves our theorem. 
5 Applications
In this section we apply the results of Sections 3 and 4 in probabilistic logics
over classical propositional logic and justification logic.
5.1 Probabilistic Logics over Classical Propositional Logic
Let CP denote classical propositional logic. If we define as basic formulas the
atomic propositions (i.e. elements of the set Prop) and if we define as evaluations
traditional truth assignments for classical propositional logic (on the set Prop),
then we can define the non-iterated and the iterated probabilistic logic over
classical propositional logic, which according to our notation are PCP and PPCP
respectively. These logics have already been defined in [28] as LPP2 and LPP1
respectively. So, we have have the following corollary:
Corollary 23. 1. LPP2,SAT is NP-complete.
2. LPP1,SAT is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The satisfiability problem for cpnb-formulas in classical propositional
logic can be decided in polynomial time (we simply have to check whether
the cpnb formula contains an atomic proposition and its negation). So if we
set C = P in Theorems 16 and 19 we conclude that LPP2,SAT ∈ NP and that
LPP1,SAT ∈ PSPACE. The lower bounds follow from the fact that LPP2 is an
extension of classical propositional logic and from Theorem 22. 
As it was observed in [28] the result of Corollary 23(1) can be obtained a
straightforward application of the methods of [10]. Also in [11], a proof sketch
(without many details) for Corollary 23(2) was given. In this paper we gave
formal proofs for both results.
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5.2 Probabilistic Logics over Justification Logic
Before defining the non-iterated and the iterated probabilistic justification logic,
we briefly recall justification logic J and its satisfiability algorithm.
5.2.1 The basic Justification Logic J
The language of justification logic [2] is defined by extending the language of
classical propositional logic with formulas of the form t : α where t is a justifica-
tion term, which is used to represent evidence, and α is a justification formula,
which is used to represent propositions, statements or facts. As we will see
later, formula α might contain terms as well. The formula t : α reads as ”t is a
justification for believing α” or as ”t justifies α”. For example, assume that we
have an agent who sees a snake behind him/her. Whereas in traditional modal
logic we can express a statement like “the agent believes/knows that he/she is
in danger”, in justification logic we can express a statement like “the agent is
in danger because there is a snake behind him/her”. In the last statement an
observation of the snake can serve as a justification. So, in justification logic
the representation of knowledge becomes explicit.
Justification terms are built from countably many constants and countably
many variables according to the following grammar:
t ::= c | x | (t · t) | (t+ t) | !t ,
where c is a constant and x is a variable. Tm denotes the set of all terms and
Con denotes the set of all constants. For c ∈ Con and n ∈ N we define
!0c := c and !n+1c := ! (!nc) .
The operators · and + are assumed to be left-associative. The intended meaning
of the connectives used in the set Tm will be clear when we present the deductive
system for J.
Formulas of the language LJ (justification formulas) are built according to
the following grammar:
α ::= p | t : α | ¬α | α ∧ α ,
where t ∈ Tm and p ∈ Prop. Following our previous notation we have
B(LJ) = Prop ∪ {t : α | α ∈ LJ} .
The deductive system for J is the Hilbert system presented in Table 2. Axiom
(J) is also called the application axiom and is the justification logic analogue of
application axiom in modal logic. It states that we can combine a justification
for α → β and a justification for α in order to obtain a justification for β.
Axiom (+), which is also called the monotonicity axiom, states that if s or t
is a justification for α then the term s + t is also a justification for α. This
operator can model monotone reasoning like proofs in some formal system of
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Axioms:
(P) finite set of axiom schemata axiomatizing classical
propositional logic in the language LJ
(J) ⊢ s : (α→ β)→ (t : α→ s · t : β)
(+) ⊢ (s : α ∨ t : α)→ s+ t : α
Rules:
(MP) if T ⊢ α and T ⊢ α→ β then T ⊢ β
(AN!) ⊢ !nc : !n−1c : · · · : !c : c : α, where c is a constant, α is
an instance of (P), (J) or (+) and n ∈ N
Table 2: The Deductive System J
mathematics: if I already have a proof t for a formula α, then t remains a proof
for α if I add a few more lines in t. Rule (AN!) states that any constant can
be used to justify any axiom and also that we can use the operator ! to express
positive introspection: if c justifies axiom instance α, then !c justifies c : α, !!c
justifies !c : c : α and so on. The previous situation is the explicit analogue of
the positive iteration of modalities in traditional modal logic: I know α, I know
that I know α and so on. The operator ! is also called proof checker or proof
verifier. This is because we can think that α is a problem given to a student,
c is the solution (or the proof) given by the student and !c is the verification
of correctness for the proof given by the tutor. So justification logic can model
the following situation:
student: I have a proof for α (i.e. c : α).
tutor: I can verify your proof for α (i.e. !c : c : α)
In justification logic it is common to assume that only some constants justify
some axioms (see the notion of constant specification in [2]). However, for
the purposes of this paper it suffices to assume that every constant justifies
every axiom (this assumption corresponds to the notion of a total constant
specification [2]).
In order to illustrate the usage of axioms and rules in J we present the
following example:
Example 24. Let a, b ∈ Con, α, β ∈ LJ and x, y be variables. Then we have the
following:
⊢J (x : α ∨ y : β)→ a · x+ b · y : (α ∨ β).
Proof. Since α → α ∨ β and β → α ∨ β are instances of (P), we can use (AN!)
to obtain
⊢J a : (α→ α ∨ β)
and
⊢J b : (β → α ∨ β).
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Using (J) and (MP) we obtain
⊢J x : α→ a · x : (α ∨ β)
and
⊢J y : β → b · y : (α ∨ β).
Using (+) and propositional reasoning we obtain
⊢J x : α→ a · x+ b · y : (α ∨ β)
and
⊢J y : β → a · x+ b · y : (α ∨ β).
We can now obtain the desired result by applying propositional reasoning. 
Logic J also enjoys the internalization property, which is presented in the fol-
lowing theorem. Internalization states that the logic internalizes its own notion
of proof. The version without premises is an explicit form of the necessitation
rule of modal logic. A proof of the following theorem can be found in [22].
Theorem 25 (Internalization). For any α, β1, . . . , βn ∈ LJ and t1, . . . , tn ∈
Tm, if
β1, . . . , βn ⊢J α
then there exists a term t such that
t1 : β1, . . . , tn : βn ⊢J t : α .
The models for J which we are going to use in this paper are calledM-models
and were introduced by Mkrtychev [25] for the logic LP. Later Kuznets [20]
adapted these models for other justification logics (including J) and proved the
corresponding soundness and completeness theorems. Formally, we have the
following:
Definition 26 (M-Model). An M-model is a pair 〈v, E〉, where v : Prop →
{T,F} and E : Tm → P(LJ) such that for every s, t ∈ Tm, for c ∈ Con and
α, β ∈ LJ, for γ being an axiom instance of J and n ∈ N we have
1.
(
α→ β ∈ E(s) and α ∈ E(t)
)
=⇒ β ∈ E(s · t) ;
2. E(s) ∪ E(t) ⊆ E(s+ t) ;
3. !n−1c : !n−2c : · · · :!c : c : γ ∈ E(!nc).
Definition 27 (Truth in an M-model). We define what it means for an LJ-
formula to hold in the M-model M = 〈v, E〉 inductively as follows (the connec-
tives ¬ and ∧ are treated classically):
M |= p⇐⇒ v(p) = T for p ∈ Prop ;
M |= t : α⇐⇒ α ∈ E(t) .
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We close this section by briefly recalling the known complexity bounds for
JSAT. The next theorem is due to Kuznets [20, 21]. We present it here briefly
using our own notation.
Theorem 28. The satisfiability problem for cpnb-formulas in logic J belongs to
coNP.
Proof. Let a be the cpnb-formula of logic J that is tested for satisfiability. As-
sume that there is no p ∈ Prop such that p appears both positively and negatively
in a (otherwise it is clear that a is not satisfiable). So, the satisfiability of a
depends only on the justification assertions that appear in a.
Let pi : αi be the assertions that appear positively in a and let ni : βi be the
assertions that appear negatively in a. A short no-certificate is an object that
has size polynomial in the size of the input (i.e. of |a|) and that can witness
that the input is a no-instance of the problem in polynomial time. So, if we
can show that the question “does a model, which satisfies all the pi : αi’s and
falsifies all the ni : βi’s, exist?” has a short no-certificate we have proved claim
of the theorem. For this purpose it suffices to guess some nj : βj (i.e. some
justification assertion that appears negatively in a) and show that every M-
model that satisfies all the pi : αi’s, satisfies nj : βj too. Our guess will not
only consist of the formula itself, but also of the way this formula is constructed
from the pi : αi’s and from the constants that justify the axioms of J. In
order to verify that our guess of the formula and its construction is correct we
have to be able to access all the formulas that are justified by a given term in
finite time. At first, it seems impossible to do this in finite time, since we have
that some terms justify infinitely many formulas (in particular every constant
justifies all the axiom instances, which are infinitely many). However, since J is
axiomatized by finitely many axiom schemes we can use schematic variables for
formulas and terms. This way we have that every constant justifies only finitely
many axiom schemes. So, the short no-certificate can be guessed as follows:
we non-deterministically choose some nj : βj . The term nj is created by the
connectives · and + using a finite tree like the following one:
+
+ ·
· ·
...
...
The above tree can be constructed in many ways but we guess one such that
in the leaves there are terms of the form !nc : · · · :!c : c or some pi’s. Such
a guess should be possible if the no-certificate exists. The fact that the tree
is constructed in that way means, nj : βj is constructed by the axioms (+),
(J), the rule (AN!), using the assumptions that every pi satisfies every αi. We
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assign to each of the tree’s leaves an axiom scheme (if the leaf is of the form
!nc : · · · :!c : c) or an αi (if the leaf is of the form pi). Then starting from the
leaves (i.e. bottom-up) we unify the schematic formulas assigned to every tree
node. If at some point the unification is impossible, then our guess is not correct.
The bottom-up unification procedure ends when we construct a formula in the
root. This formula has to be unifiable with βj , otherwise the guess is again not
correct. The formulas that we assigned to the leaves and the structure of the tree
compose the short no-certificate. It can be shown that representing formulas as
directed acyclic graphs and using Robinson’s unification algorithm [8] we can
verify that the unifications succeed in polynomial time. Hence the satisfiability
for cpnb-formulas in logic J belongs to coNP. 
Finally, we can present the known complexity bounds for JSAT.
Theorem 29. JSAT is Σ
p
2-complete.
Proof. Let α ∈ LJ be the formula that is tested for satisfiability. The upper
bound follows by Kuznets’s algorithm [20] which can be described by the fol-
lowing steps, using our notation:
1. Create a node with w T α. Apply the propositional rules for as long as
possible. Non-deterministically choose a world path pwij . This can be
done in non-determinstic polynomial time.
2. Verify that Bpwij is satisfiable using the coNP-algorithm of Theorem 28.
Observe that there is no rule that produces new worlds in the above algorithm.
We have presented the algorithm using world signs in order to be consistent with
our tableau notation. The lower bound follows by a result of Achilleos [1]. 
5.2.2 Probabilistic Justification Logic
Let M be an M-model. Based on M we can define the evaluation vM as follows:
for every β ∈ B(LJ), vM (β) = T if and only if M |= β.
So, if we set L = J, L = LJ and we define the evaluations as above, we can
define the non-iterated probabilistic logic over J, which is the logic PJ. For the
complexity of the satisfiability problem in PJ, we have the following corollary:
Corollary 30. PJSAT is Σ
p
2-complete.
Proof. The upper bound follows from Theorems 28 and 16. Since PJ is an
extension of J and JSAT is Σ
p
2-hard (Theorem 29) we get the lower bound. 
Now we will present the iterated probabilistic justification logic PPJ. Ac-
cording to our previous definitions, in order to define the language of PPJ,
which is called LPPJ, it suffices to define the basic formulas of PPJ. So, we
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define B(LPPJ) = Prop ∪ {t : A | A ∈ LPPJ}. For the convenience of the reader
we give the complete definition of LPPJ, i.e.
A ::= p | t : A | ¬A | A ∧A | P≥sA,
where p ∈ Prop and s ∈ Q ∩ [0, 1]. We observe that the basic formulas of PPJ
may contain random formulas of PPJ. So, the reader might think that the
basic formulas do not have much simpler structure than the normal formulas of
PPJ . However, the complex formulas of PPJ can appear only in the scope of
justification terms. In PPJ, since there is no axiom that can draw a formula from
the scope of a justification term (e.g. t : A → A), formulas that appear under
the scope of a justification operator practically behave as atomic propositions.
So, decidability and complexity of basic PPJ-formulas is much simpler to prove
than decidability and complexity of random PPJ-formulas.
In order to define the PPJ-models we have to define evaluations for basic
PPJ-formulas. Since basic PPJ-formulas resemble basic J-formulas, it makes
sense to extend the definition of M-models in order to define evaluations for
PPJ. So, as in the case of logic J we have to present the deductive system of
PPJ first. This system is presented in Table 3. The axiomatization of PPJ is a
combination of the axiomatization for LPP1 [28] and of the axiomatization for
the basic justification logic J. Axiom (NN) corresponds to the fact that the prob-
ability of truthfulness of every formula is at least 0 (the acronym (NN) stands for
non-negative). Observe that by substituting ¬A for A in (NN), we have P≥0¬A,
which by our syntactical abbreviations is P≤1A. Hence axiom (NN) also corre-
sponds to the fact that the probability of truthfulness for every formula is at
most 1. Axioms (L1) and (L2) describe some properties of inequalities (the L in
(L1) and (L2) stands for less). Axioms (Add1) and (Add2) correspond to the ad-
ditivity of probabilities for disjoint events (the Add in (Add1) and (Add2) stands
for additivity). Rule (PN) is the probabilistic analogue of the necessitation rule
in modal logics (hence the acronym (PN) stands for probabilist necessitation):
if a formula is valid, then it has probability 1. Rule (ST) intuitively states
that if the probability of a formula is arbitrary close to s, then it is at least
s. Observe that the rule (ST) is infinitary in the sense that it has an infinite
number of premises. It corresponds to the Archimedean property for the real
numbers. The acronym (ST) stands for strengthening, since the statement of
the result is stronger than the statement of the premises. Rule (ST) was in-
troduced in [27, 32] so that strong completeness for probabilistic logics could
be proved. We recall that a logical system is strongly complete if and only if
every consistent set (finite or infinite) has a model. As it is shown in [27, 32],
languages used for probabilistic logics are non-compact, so the proof of strong
completeness is impossible without an infinitary rule.
So, now we can extend Definition 26 to the basic formulas of LPPJ. Recall
that basic PPJ-formulas may contain iterated probabilistic operators under the
scope of justification terms. This is the reason why we cannot use the standard
M -models for basic PPJ-formulas. However since, as we mentioned before, PPJ-
formulas under the scope of justification operators practically behave as atomic
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Axioms:
(P) finitely many axiom schemata axiomatizing
classical propositional logic in the language LPPJ
(NN) ⊢ P≥0A
(L1) ⊢ P≤rA→ P<sA, where s > r
(L2) ⊢ P<sA→ P≤sA
(Add1) ⊢ P≥rA ∧ P≥sB ∧ P≥1¬(A ∧B)→ P≥min(1,r+s)(A ∨B)
(Add2) ⊢ P≤rA ∧ P<sB → P<r+s(A ∨B), where r + s ≤ 1
(J) ⊢ s : (A→ B)→ (t : A→ s · t : B)
(+) ⊢ (s : A ∨ t : A)→ s+ t : A
Rules:
(MP) if T ⊢ A and T ⊢ A→ B then T ⊢ B
(PN) if ⊢ A then ⊢ P≥1A
(ST) if T ⊢ A→ P≥s− 1
k
B for every integer k ≥ 1
s
and s > 0
then T ⊢ A→ P≥sB
(AN!) ⊢ !nc : !n−1c : · · · : !c : c : A, where c ∈ Con, A is
an instance of some PPJ-axiom and n ∈ N
Table 3: The Deductive System PPJ
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propositions the only difference between between extended M-models and nor-
mal ones is that in the former we have the logic PPJ in the place where the later
have the logic J.
Definition 31 (Extended M-Model). An extended M-model is a pair 〈v, E〉,
where v : Prop → {T,F} and E : Tm → P(LPPJ) such that for every s, t ∈ Tm,
for c ∈ Con and A,B ∈ LPPJ, for C being an axiom instance of PPJ and n ∈ N
we have
1.
(
A→ B ∈ E(s) and A ∈ E(t)
)
=⇒ B ∈ E(s · t) ;
2. E(s) ∪ E(t) ⊆ E(s+ t) ;
3. !n−1c : !n−2c : · · · :!c : c : C ∈ E(!nc).
We can define evaluations based on extended M-models in the same way
as for the standard M-models. So a PPJ-model is a PPL-model where the
evaluations are based on extended M-models. This completes the definition
of semantics for PPJ.
Now we are ready to present the complexity bounds for PPJSAT.
Theorem 32. The satisfiability problem for cpnb-formulas in logic PPJ belongs
to coNP.
Proof. We recall that cpnb-formulas in LPPJ are conjunctions of positive and
negative atomic propositions and positive and negative formulas of the form
t : A, where A ∈ LPPJ.
Since the cpnb-formulas in LPPJ resemble the cpnb-formulas in LJ we will use
a slight variation of the algorithm in Theorem 28 for deciding the satisfiability
of cpnb-formulas. It is not difficult to observe that the algorithm of Theorem 28
does not depend on what the axioms of the logic are, as long as they are finitely
many. Assume that a is the cpnb-formula of logic PPJ that we want to test
for satisfiability. As in the proof of Theorem 28 we can choose a formula t : B
that appears negatively in a, guess a tree that describes the construction of t,
assign to the leaves of the tree PPJ-axioms and formulas and then verify that
our guess is correct using unification. However, since the axioms of PPJ have
different form than the axioms of J we have to modify the unification algorithm.
Simple unification is not sufficient any more, since the axioms of PPJ come with
linear conditions. In the rest of the proof we explain that the verification can
be done in polynomial time by using a unification algorithm and by testing a
linear system for satisfiability.
Whereas for LJ we need two kinds of schematic variables (for terms and for-
mulas), for LPPJ we need three kinds of schematic variables: for terms, formulas
and rational numbers. Also, because of the side conditions that come with the
axioms (L1) and (Add2) our schematic formulas should be paired with systems
of linear inequalities. For example, the scheme (L1) should be represented by the
schematic formula P≤rA → P<sA (with the schematic variables r, s, and A)
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together with the inequality r < s, whereas a scheme that is obtained by a
conjunction of the schemata (L1) and (Add2) should be represented as(
P≤r1A1 → P<s1A1
)
∧
(
P≤r2A2 ∧ P<s2B2 → P<r2+s2(A2 ∨B2)
)
together with the inequalities{
r1 < s1, r2 + s2 ≤ 1
}
.
We should not forget that the rational variables belong to Q∩ [0, 1]. So we have
to add constraints like 0 ≤ r ≤ 1. Hence in addition to constructing unification
equations we need to take care of the linear constraints. For instance, in order
to unify the schemata P≥rA and P≥sB the algorithm has to unify A and B,
and to equate r and s, i.e. it adds r = s to the linear system. At the end the
verification algorithm will succeed only if the standard unification of formulas
succeeds and the linear system is solvable.
Another complication are constraints of the form
l = min(1, r + s) (16)
that originate from the scheme (Add1). Obviously, Eq. (16) is not linear. How-
ever, we find that Eq. (16) has a solution if and only if one of the set of equations
{l = r + s, r + s ≤ 1} or {l = 1, r + s > 1}
has a solution. Thus whenever we come to an equation like (16) we can non-
deterministically chose one of the equivalent set of equations and add it to the
constructed linear system.
We conclude that we can guess a tree for t and also a linear system in non-
deterministic polynomial time. We also find that the verification can be done in
polynomial time, since testing a linear system for satisfiability can be done in
polynomial time [14] and unification of formulas can be checked in polynomial
time using Robinson’s algorithm. So, as in the case of J we can show that the
satisfiability problem for cpnb-formulas in PPJ has short no-certificates, i.e it
belongs to coNP. 
Remark 33. It might seem strange to the reader that the cpnb-formulas of J
and PPJ have the same upper complexity bound. At first sight the PPJ cpnb-
formulas seem more complex, since they may contain probabilistic operators
(and iterations of them). However in the PPJ cpnb-formulas, the probabilistic
operators, may occur only under the scope of justification terms. This means
that the probabilistic operators cannot impose any conditions for satisfiability.
For example in t : P≥sA, the formula P≥sA does not have to be satisfiable.
So, probabilistic operators under the scope of justification operators, behave
as atomic propositions. In particular they are more sophisticated than simple
atomic propositions because they consist of rational numbers and formulas.
It is not difficult to see, that the only impact that this has on the standard
decidability procedure for the logic J is on the unification algorithm. That is
why the biggest part of the proof for Theorem 32 is devoted on showing how
the modified unification algorithm works and that it runs in polynomial time.
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Corollary 34. PPJSAT is PSPACE-complete.
Proof. The upper bound follows from Theorems 32 and 19. The lower bound
follows from Theorem 22. 
6 Conclusion
We have presented upper and lower complexity bounds for the satisfiability
problem in non-iterated and iterated probabilistic logics over any extension of
classical propositional logic. The aforementioned bounds are parameterized on
the complexity of satisfiability of conjunctions of positive and negative formulas
that have neither a probabilistic nor a classical operator as their top-connectives.
As an application we have shown how tight bounds for the complexity of satisfia-
bility in non-iterated and iterated probabilistic logics over classical propositional
logic and justification logic can be obtained. It is interesting that both for clas-
sical propositional logic and for the basic justification logic J adding non-nested
probabilistic operators to the language does not increase the complexity of the
satisfiability problem.
Now we present some directions for further research. The probabilistic logic
of [9] allows iterations of some probabilistic operators, that are more compli-
cated than the ones used in this paper. It would be interesting to check whether
the tableau procedure of our paper is applicable in this logic. Another inter-
esting question is the following: Rašković et al. [33] define a probabilistic logic
over classical propositional logic, called LPPS, using approximate conditional
probabilities with the intention to model non-monotonic reasoning. The satisfi-
ability problem for LPPS is again reduced to solving linear systems. In [30] the
logic of [33] is extended to a probabilistic logic with approximate conditional
probabilities over justification logic. What are the complexity bounds for the
satisfiability problem in the logics of [33] and [30]?
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